Chapter 44: Newcomb’s Paradox
Newcomb’s paradox is a thought experiment involving a game between two players, where one of these players is able to predict the future. The game is mainly operated by the “Predictor”, who is supposedly always accurate and incapable of error. The discussion by Nozick says only that the Predictor's predictions are "almost certainly" correct, and also specifies that "what you actually decide to do is not part of the explanation of why he made the prediction he made”. I wish Gardner would have included more examples and situations to make the paradox easier to understand, like I found in one of my sources. Franz Kiekeben uses the example of a hypochondriac wanting to be a basketball player to show that there is no casual interaction in the case of Newcomb’s paradox. However, Kiekeben also gets very into detail with the definition of prediction, which I am glad Gardner did not include in the chapter because it doesn’t seem very relevant. I found in my source from Texas A&M University that free will also plays a big role in this paradox, which was not really mentioned in the book. I feel like human beings and their ability to make their own independent decisions is an important part of the game. The Texas A&M University source also added Newcomb-like problems which I found to be irrelevant as well. In my opinion, Newcomb’s paradox is problematic on several levels. The fact that a physical impossibility is included (the ability of predicting a human action) shows that relative prediction is possible indeed.
The Game
The player of the game is presented with two boxes, one transparent (box A) and the other opaque (box B). The player is allowed to take the contents of both boxes, or just the contents of box B. Box A hold $1000, which is visible. The contents of box B are not visible however, and they are determined before the start of the game. The Predictor makes a prediction as to whether the player of the game will take just box B, or both of them. If the Predictor predicts that both boxes will be taken, box B will not contain anything. But if the Predictor predicts that only box B will be taken, then it will contain $1,000,000. When the game begins, and the player is called to choose which boxes to take, the prediction has already been made, and therefore the contents of box B have already been determined.The problem is called a paradox because two strategies that both seem logical give conflicting answers.The first strategy is that regardless of what prediction was made, taking both boxes will give the player more money. However, even if the prediction is for the player to take only B, then taking both boxes yields $1,001,000, and taking only B yields only $1,000,000. Therefore, taking both boxes is still a better choice, regardless of the prediction made.
References:
Galef, Julia. "Newcomb’s Paradox: An Argument for Irrationality." Rationally Speaking Aug.-Sept. 2010: n. pag. Print.
Mackie, J. L. “Newcomb’s Paradox and the Direction of Causation”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
"Newcomb." Franz Kiekeben. N.p., n.d. Web. 27 Oct. 2014.
"Newcomb's Paradox." Texas A&M University. N.p., n.d. Web. 27 Oct. 2014.
This paradox is very interesting. It took me a little bit to try and what this chapter was trying to portray because this paradox was confusing to me at first. I found this video that goes into detail about this that I thought was a little helpful: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aR5GYeZkgvY
ReplyDeleteThis is a very interesting topic. If the prediction is made and cannot be changed, then I don't see why choosing one box would still be an option when one is better off with choosing both boxes,maybe it is because I missed the mathematical explanation of the probability of moves 1 & 2 in the chapter. Anyway, I am still missing the representation of free will because the player already knows that there is a $1000 in one box which will make him better off if he chooses both boxes; so like me and any other rational being, the player would be forced ( sayby greed) to choose an option where there is less risk of losing everything (which is choosing two boxes), therefore the two choices would not get equal preference, hence why I think the player's choice fails to be based entirely on free will. Though there is no strategic behavior in this game, I think this parallels with the behavior of competitors in a non-collusive oligopoly, in which they make their decisions based on their rivals' behavior. All in all, I think in a case where choice is determined by factors, being positive or negative, then freewill is eliminated
ReplyDeleteBased on the explanation, it seems that taking both boxes is the best strategy for the player who isn't the predictor. There doesn't seem to be any relevance on what the predictor predicts, which is why I'm having trouble seeing as how this is a game. The paradox itself was hard to understand initially as I had to reread it again to make sense of it but know I think I understand it a bit better.
ReplyDelete